Russia Resurgent, Part 1
The conflicting accounts of the confrontation in Georgia means that I have delayed writing anything about it until I had a clearer idea of what was going on.
Russia is responsible for both the proximate and permissive causes of this conflict. The immediate flashpoint was a roadside bombing committed by South Ossetian militia that killed five Georgians. This was the final straw in a long line of provocations aided and encouraged by the Russian government.
Russia’s claims regarding its motivations are patently false. Their actions in Chechnya and Kosovo betray the hypocrisy of their new-found concern for civilian lives and self-determination in the Caucasus; their peacekeeping mission had done little to keep South Ossetian militias from attacking Georgians; their estimates of civilian casualties have been wildly exaggerated; and Russian forces have been engaged in acts of ethnic cleansing, looting and murder.
Even if we accept Russian motivations, their response has been grossly disproportionate. Attacks beyond South Ossetia, the occupation of Gori, and the opening of a second front in the strategically important region of Abkhazia are completely beyond the scope of Russia’s stated objectives. Russia has been aiming to consolidate its grip on a former province, punish a leader who sees his country’s future with the West, and further monopolise energy supplies as a source of influence.
Commentators have been keen to liken the conflict to everything from the Falklands, through Kosovo, Czechoslovakia (twice) to the Hungarian uprising. While there is an element of truth in many of these analogies, they run the risk of simplifying the conflict. Clausewitz remarked that every war is unique. It has its own causes, its own dynamic and its own sides. Comparisons, though useful in the specific, cannot provide us with a clear historical precedent on which to base our response.
What is clear now is that we are faced with a resurgent Russia keen to assert its authority, and presently hostile to Western interests. Devoid of the cloak of Communism, this presents new challenges for policy-makers in their response.
Georgia is an ally that deserves our support. Saakashvili has been keen to institute economic and political reforms that have brought about a society freer than that north of its borders. It has been a key ally in the war in Iraq, and its loyalty deserves our support. The West must support those states that share its values.
So far, the response of the West has left much to be desired. It has been divided, ineffectual and dithering. As a result Russia has managed to act with impunity, and the West has been shown up as unable to defend the values it seeks to promote. The need for a new response is more pressing than ever.
Russia is pushing the limits of acceptable international behaviour. It is a society capable of constructive partnership with the West, but presently slipping under a wave of paranoid authoritarian nationalism. The West has to remind Russia of these limits while encouraging those elements of Russian society that offer a more positive vision than Putin’s. That requires a foreign policy capable of standing up to, and punishing, Russia where necessary while promoting reformist elements where possible.
Part 2 will some of the policy options available to the West for dealing with Russia.
Sphere: Related ContentThe No Vote Affirms Democracy
The Irish “No” vote in yesterday’s referendum on the Lisbon treaty has sent European leaders on an elaborate finger-pointing exercise. Fears about abortion, neutrality and taxation are blamed as the proximate reasons for the rejection. Anything is blamed other than a dissatisfaction with the direction in which the EU is heading.
To place the blame so squarely with such disparate and supposedly “fatuous” issues is to miss the point. There is deep discomfort among many about the very nature of the treaty and the wider institutions of the European Union. That the No Campaign’s supposed “fear-mongering” was successful is a condemnation of the impenetrability of the treaty. The attempt to pass the treaty by making it so ambiguous, confusing and inaccessible backfired: it made it near impossible to rebut the concerns raised by opponents.
The issues on which the Irish voted were tangential to a larger issue: the arrogance of the institution as a whole. The Lisbon treaty represented the EU at its worst: unaccountable, inaccessible and undemocratic. Many Europeans feel that their leaders are pushing for a European project that is moving too quickly and in the wrong direction. The failure to accept the French and Dutch “no” votes, and the resulting refusals for others to hold referenda on Lisbon, represented an EU that did not care about the opinions of its citizens.
It does not have to be this way: the sensible route for reform in an enlarged EU is to ditch the dream of federalism and work on a smaller, more accountable institution. I doubt anyone believes that the EU is best in its present state. What the No voters object to is the top-down and “more of the same, but better” attitude of reform at present.
Sphere: Related ContentZimbabwe and the Failure of Quiet Diplomacy
It looks like President Thabo Mbeki’s policy of “Quiet Diplomacy” with Zimbabwe has finally been denounced as a disaster by world leaders. The criticism has extended beyond muted signs of displeasure to condemnation both within the respective countries and outside. Senior ANC leaders have called on Mr. Mbeki to alter his stance, and MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai has expressed his desire for South Africa be replaced as mediator in the crisis. Western leaders have upped their criticisms of the policy, with the President of South Africa facing unprecedented criticism for his stance.
It is worth examining what effects this policy, which has led Mr. Mbeki to claim there is no electoral crisis, has had on Zimbabwe. In terms of positive results, it has yielded little. Zimbabwe, once one of the healthiest economies in Africa, has been plunged into a crisis that worsens every day. Inflation stands at over 100,000% and is predicted to hit the 1.5million% mark by the end of the year. Its healthcare system has failed, with many children orphaned by an AIDS crisis Mr. Mbeki refuses to take seriously. Political violence, intimidation and corruption remain endemic. None of this has been ameliorated by South Africa’s diplomatic efforts, and this grim situation has worsened severely during Mbeki’s time in office.
Crisis? What Crisis?
This policy has resulted in the strengthening of Mr. Mugabe’s regime and the hampering of the ability of other countries to effectively address the plight of the Zimbabwean people. By indulging his belief that the criticisms leveled against him are part of a neo-colonial plot, Mbeki has granted Robert Mugabe a legitimacy that he would not otherwise have. Far from improving the situation for Zimbabweans, this refusal to criticise has worsened it by allowing Mugabe to cling to power with that legitimacy. His dogmatic insistence that the Zimbabwe situation be viewed as the continuation of an anti-colonial struggle several decades after the end of white rule has handed Mugabe an easy shield to deflect criticism in return for no concessions.
It is becoming increasingly apparent that Robert Mugabe is delusional. One only has to read recent interviews with the man to realise that his behaviour and opinions reflect not the cynical manipulation of popular passions, but a genuine self-assurance of his own certitude and an unwavering belief that the responsibility for his country’s suffering lies with anyone but him. In this situation a coddling appeasement serves not to render the man receptive to the opinions of others, but to reinforce his belief that he is a faultless victim. Stroking his ego has only inflated his destructive arrogance, with disastrous results.
A tragedy in and of itself has been that it is in the interest of all to stand firm in condemnation of the actions of the Zimbabwean government. Zimbabwe lacks the economic and military clout to seriously threaten it international critics; the constraints of realpolitik are considerably fewer than in dealing with a country of economic or strategic significance. There is everything to gain in pragmatic terms by supporting reform in a country that has demonstrated such economic potential, and a moral mandate to criticise Mugabe’s corrupt despotism. Mbeki in particular can make the pragmatic case, given the influx of Zimbabwean refugees into South Africa.
A far better response would have been the more robust one. Standing up to the Zimbabwean Government would have limited their ability to manoeuvre diplomatically and politically, making it harder for them to acquiesce in the current crisis. Had South Africa been firmer from the outset in dealing with the regime and challenging its actions, it might have been able to limit the machinations of Zanu-PF and the generals now lining up to try and succeed Mugabe. A tough stance that refused to indulge Mugabe’s delusions might not wake him up to reality, but his isolation would afford him less political protection than he currently has. This is not to advocate a US-style hawkish diplomacy against Zimbabwe. That would be entirely inappropriate for the situation and the country, and have a very dubious prospect of success. Rather to stand up to Zimbabwe would involve stronger words supported with resolute action, a refusal to indulge Mugabe’s fantasies, and joining the rest of the world in the sanctions they have placed on the regime.
The world currently awaits the results of this most contentious of Zimbabwean elections. A change of stance from President Mbeki might go miles in delivering a resolution to this crisis. Let’s hope it’s not too late.
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