Russia Resurgent, Part 1
The conflicting accounts of the confrontation in Georgia means that I have delayed writing anything about it until I had a clearer idea of what was going on.
Russia is responsible for both the proximate and permissive causes of this conflict. The immediate flashpoint was a roadside bombing committed by South Ossetian militia that killed five Georgians. This was the final straw in a long line of provocations aided and encouraged by the Russian government.
Russia’s claims regarding its motivations are patently false. Their actions in Chechnya and Kosovo betray the hypocrisy of their new-found concern for civilian lives and self-determination in the Caucasus; their peacekeeping mission had done little to keep South Ossetian militias from attacking Georgians; their estimates of civilian casualties have been wildly exaggerated; and Russian forces have been engaged in acts of ethnic cleansing, looting and murder.
Even if we accept Russian motivations, their response has been grossly disproportionate. Attacks beyond South Ossetia, the occupation of Gori, and the opening of a second front in the strategically important region of Abkhazia are completely beyond the scope of Russia’s stated objectives. Russia has been aiming to consolidate its grip on a former province, punish a leader who sees his country’s future with the West, and further monopolise energy supplies as a source of influence.
Commentators have been keen to liken the conflict to everything from the Falklands, through Kosovo, Czechoslovakia (twice) to the Hungarian uprising. While there is an element of truth in many of these analogies, they run the risk of simplifying the conflict. Clausewitz remarked that every war is unique. It has its own causes, its own dynamic and its own sides. Comparisons, though useful in the specific, cannot provide us with a clear historical precedent on which to base our response.
What is clear now is that we are faced with a resurgent Russia keen to assert its authority, and presently hostile to Western interests. Devoid of the cloak of Communism, this presents new challenges for policy-makers in their response.
Georgia is an ally that deserves our support. Saakashvili has been keen to institute economic and political reforms that have brought about a society freer than that north of its borders. It has been a key ally in the war in Iraq, and its loyalty deserves our support. The West must support those states that share its values.
So far, the response of the West has left much to be desired. It has been divided, ineffectual and dithering. As a result Russia has managed to act with impunity, and the West has been shown up as unable to defend the values it seeks to promote. The need for a new response is more pressing than ever.
Russia is pushing the limits of acceptable international behaviour. It is a society capable of constructive partnership with the West, but presently slipping under a wave of paranoid authoritarian nationalism. The West has to remind Russia of these limits while encouraging those elements of Russian society that offer a more positive vision than Putin’s. That requires a foreign policy capable of standing up to, and punishing, Russia where necessary while promoting reformist elements where possible.
Part 2 will some of the policy options available to the West for dealing with Russia.
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