Michael Walzer on the Georgian Crisis
From Dissent:
Sphere: Related Content1) This is an unjust war. That may seem obvious here in the U.S., but the Russians have worked hard to justify their attack, using the humanitarian language that everyone now uses to defend military operations in other people’s countries. It is important to address their claims, especially because they have received some credence in Europe. It is also relatively easy to do that since reporters and human rights activists have been allowed into parts of Georgia now under Russian control. As a result, we know that the South Ossetian city of Tskhinvali has not been destroyed by the Georgian army. “Fighting appears to have been concentrated in two neighborhoods, while buildings in the rest of the city stood intact,” reports the New York Times (August 13, 2008). “Entire residential neighborhoods appear unscathed.” Nor is the Russian claim that the Georgians killed or injured 2,000 civilians credible. Human Rights Watch, checking the local hospital, has come up with the figure of 44 dead and 273 wounded in clashes between Ossetian separatists and Georgian soldiers—and one doctor told reporters that the majority of the wounded were soldiers (New York Times, August 15, 2008). The Putin government apparently believes that anything less than the Big Lie won’t be persuasive, and this Big Lie may be effective in Russia, where the government dominates the media. It shouldn’t be credited in the rest of the world. This isn’t a humanitarian intervention, and it isn’t a peacekeeping operation.
2) The argument that Russian soldiers made to journalists—that what they are doing is exactly what the U.S. would have done if Russia had armed and trained the army of a “friendly” Central American country—isn’t a defense of the invasion. Imagine the Russians sending equipment and expert help to the Nicaraguan army in the 1980s. Might we have responded with something much bigger than the contra insurrection? Yes, and we might also have justified whatever our armed forces did by talking about human rights and peacekeeping. But we would have been wrong. The military operation would have been unjust, and many Americans would have said that. Imagining this hypothetical invasion, I also imagine the scale and intensity of the protests.
3) The movement of Georgian soldiers into South Ossetia was reckless, certainly, but it wasn’t the reason—it was only the excuse—for the Russian invasion. The reason lies in American policy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the years since 1989, which the Russians have interpreted, not implausibly, as aiming at and achieving a significant reduction in their power and prestige. I don’t think that the policy was necessarily wrong, or wrong at all, but it was, like President Saakashvili’s Ossetian adventure, reckless. We never reckoned on a Russian response or planned for it or consulted with our allies about what might have to be done. Russia’s strategic aggressiveness in Georgia obviously took the Bush administration by surprise. Just like the Iraqi insurgency. Just like the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Just like the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections. Just like the fall of Musharraf in Pakistan.
4)What is happening in Georgia is a major defeat for America and for the EU as well. It demonstrates that these two great powers, publicly committed to the advance of democracy in Europe, are unable to defend the territorial integrity or physical security of democratic Georgia. But the invasion may not turn out to be a victory for Russia. The most heartening moment in the last week was the arrival in Tbilisi on Tuesday of the presidents of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, and Poland to stand in solidarity with Saakashvili. They are not ready to accept the reassertion of an old-fashioned Russian “sphere of influence.” And their public presence and resistance are more important than any American or European statements.
5)The European response has been particularly weak, and we have to worry that the weakness is due to European dependence on Russian oil—which would be greatly heightened if the pipeline across Georgia and Turkey were cut. I don’t think that the Russians invaded Georgia for the oil; I don’t think that America invaded Iraq for the oil. But oil is a factor in imperial politics, and the EU needs to think about a version of Russian domination that is commercial rather than political or military—an “empire” entirely appropriate to the twenty-first century. One response that the Russians would notice would be a large-scale campaign for conservation and a massive investment in alternative sources of energy.
6)We need a better foreign policy debate than this election campaign has yet produced, and the Georgian disaster would be a useful starting point.
No to Kneejerk Justice
Not long after Jacqui Smith declared that the 42-Days detention measure was brought in as part of a new culture of preventing knee-jerk legislation, Jack Straw… puts through knee-jerk legislation. After a ruling by the Law Lords last week that the present witness anonymity rules jeopardise fair trials, Mr. Straw has decided that the best response is to rush through a Bill that risks being poorly thought-through, failing to adequately address the issues at stake, and filled with unintended consequences.
The reasons for doing so are perfectly understandable: the ruling risks undermining numerous trials that rely on the testimony of anonymous witnesses. The police consider it vital for convicting gang members, drug dealers and murderers. Their case is admirable, but so is that of the Law Lords. It is fundamental to a fair trial to be able to face one’s accuser; to be unable to do so moves the burden of proof away from the prosecution. The defence, unable to cross-examine the credibility of a witness, have to disprove their testimony. In so doing the presumption of innocence is removed. Moreover, the psychological effect of witnesses giving testimony anonymously prejudices the outcome of the trial by implying that the accused is violent.
In these cases the ability to get witnesses to come forward needs to be balanced against the right to face one’s accusers. The Law Lords felt that this was not occurring. The Government’s response should be to take this move constructively and create a law that deals with this serious problem. The concern that the system could allow for a miscarriage of justice is genuine: emergency legislation will not alleviate it. The best solution would be to have a free vote on the matter to ensure proper scrutiny and discussion of what is a particularly difficult legal conundrum. Parliament lends itself towards this solution: the Commons is filled with lawyers, and their expertise, scrutinised through various readings and checked against the expert opinion of those in the Lords, could produce a sensible law. The debate should be constructive and beyond party-political lines. The legislature moves slowly because justice must be deliberate.
More haste less speed.
Sphere: Related Content
2) The argument that Russian soldiers made to journalists—that what they are doing is exactly what the U.S. would have done if Russia had armed and trained the army of a “friendly” Central American country—isn’t a defense of the invasion. Imagine the Russians sending equipment and expert help to the Nicaraguan army in the 1980s. Might we have responded with something much bigger than the contra insurrection? Yes, and we might also have justified whatever our armed forces did by talking about human rights and peacekeeping. But we would have been wrong. The military operation would have been unjust, and many Americans would have said that. Imagining this hypothetical invasion, I also imagine the scale and intensity of the protests.
